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RIGHT OF ANGARY
RIGHT OD ANGARY
THE recent requisition of Dutch ships in American ports
affords us an interesting example of a revival of Jus Angariae,
or as it is sometimes called Prestation.1- This right has had a
varied and often highly controversial history. In its origin it
signified the right of the sovereign, or other public authority, to
employ compulsory service for the carriage of messages.2 It was
essentially a royal prerogative, very similar in character to certain
feudal claims, such as the right of purveyance.
During the middle ages the term somewhat changed its mean-
ing, and came to acquire a distinct maritime significance. As
then employed, it described the practice of belligerent nations in
seizing neutral ships within the local jurisdiction, and in pressing
them, and their crews, into service for the transport of troops,
food, supplies, munitions,3 etc. The validity of this practice was
clearly recognized both by the civil and common law. By the
civil law, according to the Black Book of the Admiralty,, "a king
was justified in pressing into service, or seizing ships of every
description and of every nation which might be found in his ports
for purposes of urgent necessity, but, nevertheless, a tacit condi-
tion of safe return was annexed to such seizure or pressing. By
the ancient laws of England, the admiral might arrest any ships
for the King's service, and after he had made a return of the
arrest in chancery, the owner of the ship could not plead against
such return because 'L'Admiral et son Lieutenant sont de record."
It is also evident "from the ancient writs and patents of
England that the Admiral, the wardens of the Cinque Ports, and
others, were authorized to seize ships of war and other vessels, to
impress seamen, and commandeer provisions and arms for pur-
1 Some of the older writers drew a distinction between Prestation
and Angary. The former was applied to the impressment of neutral
vessels and crews into the transport service of the belligerent: the
latter was restricted to the requisitioning of neutral cargoes. But this
distinction has been disregarded by modern writers. The terms are
now used interchangeably.2 Woolsey, International Law, Sec. 118, note.
3 20ppenheim, International Law 394.
4 1 Halleck, International Law 485, note.
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poses of national defense." 5 The exercise of this right apparently
was not limited to English ships only. By way of partial satis-
faction to the neutral, it was customary for the belligerent to pay
freight for such services in advance.
The exercise of this right became so vexatious to neutrals
that a series of treaties were drawn up in the 17th and 18th
centuries, in some cases abolishing and in others modifying the
practice. 6 According to the terms of some of these agreements,
the states mutually agreed to prohibit the seizure of ships or
merchandise for public purposes, either in times of peace or war.
By the treaty of 1785 between Prussia and the United States,
7
Article 16, it was provided "that the subjects or citizens of each
of the contracting parties, their vessels and effects, shall not be
liable to any embargo or detention on the part of the other for
any military expedition or other public or private purposes what-
soever." In certain other cases, where the right of angary was
conditionally recognized, it is expressly stipulated that the neutral
owners shall be fully compensated for their services. In the
revision of the treaty with Prussia in 1799, the above clause was
eliminated, and in its place there was inserted a provision author-
izing the requisition of vessels of the respective countries, but
providing that "the proprietors of the vessels which shall have
been detained whether for some military expedition, or for what
other use soever, shall obtain from the government that shall
have employed them, an equitable indemnity, as well for the
freight as for the loss occasioned by the delay." Similar stipu-
lations are to be found in a number of treaties with the Central
and South American statesY
Writing in 1789 De Martens0 declared that:
5 Ibid.
62 Oppenheim, International Law 394.
72 Malloy. Treaties and Conventions, etc., between the United
'States an-d Other Powers 1482.
8 Ibid. p. 1492.
9 Article 7 of the treaty of 1828 with Brazil provides that the citi-
zens of the contracting parties shall "not be liable to any embargo nor
be detained with their vessels, cargoes, or merchandise or effects, for
any military expedition nor for any public or private purpose what-
ever, without allowing to those interested a sufficient indemnification."
6 Moore, Digest of International Law 907. The treaty of 1830 with
Venezuela runs to the same effect. 8 Stat. at L. 470. Germany has
also entered into similar agreements with Salvador, Portugal, Costa
Rica, M4Qxico, Dominican Republic, Gautemala, Honduras, Colombia,
and Nicaragua. Perels, Das internationale offentliche Seerecht p. 222,
note.
10 De Martens, Prdcis du droit des gens moderne de l'Europe, See.
269.
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"It is doubtful if the common law of nations gives to a belliger-
ent, except in case of extreme necessity, the right of seizing neutral
vessels lying in its ports at the outbreak of war, in order to meet
the requirement of its fleet on payment of their services."
But, notwithstanding some misgivings, the majority of jurists
continued to recognize the validity of the practice in time of
national emergency, subject, of course, to the payment of proper
compensation. Azuni, for example, boldly asserted11 that a neu-
tral vessel which attempted to escape from such requisition, would
be liable to confiscation.
The close of the century witnessed a revival of the right.
Napoleon again called the practice into play. 'The 'fleet that
carried his expedition into Egypt in 1798 was largely made up of
neutral ships, which were commandeered in French ports for
that purpo se.
1 2
With the development of more hufmane methods' of warfare
and a more general recognition of the rights of neutrals in the
19th century, the right of angary took on a less arbitrary and
oppressive character. According to modern usage the right is
restricted to the seizure or use of neutral ships and property Which
may be found within the local jurisdiction or on the enemy terri-
tory or the high seas.'13 In case of military necessity it is some-
times recognized that the property may even be destroyed.
The right of angary in many respects resembles an embargo.
But the two powers, as Calvo points out :'4 "different dans leur
nature comme dans leurs effets." An embargo "pour etre legitime,
doit etre general, restreint dans les plus etroites limites et fonde
sur des raisons majeui-s: il n'implique, le plus communement, que
la responsabilite morale du° gouvernement qui l'exerce." .The
right of angary "au contraire, est essentiellement special, et, en
raison des risques et des charges onereuses qu'il impose au navire
qui le subit, il engage la responsabilite materielle et financiere de
l'Etat qu'une necessite d'ordre superieur condamne a Y recourir."
Neutral crews, it will be observed, are no longer forced to
become active participants in the war. The neutral property only
remains liable to seizure for military purposes. In other words
neutral ships in certain exigencies are treated the same as 'national
property.
13 Azuni. Droit Maritime, Pt. 1 Chap. III Art. 5; Taylor, Inter-
national Law 702.
12 Hall, International Law 767.
'1 2 Oppenheim, International Law 395.
14 3 Calvo, Droit International 139.
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"The object of the right of angary" says Oppenheim, 15 "is
such property of subjects of neutral states as retains its neutral
character from its temporary position on belligerent territory, and
which therefore is not vested with enemy character. All sorts of
neutral property, whether it consists of vessels or other means of
transport or arms, ammunition, provisions, or other personal prop-
erty, may be the object of the right of angary, provided the
articles concerned are serviceable to military ends and wants. The
conditions under which the right can be exercised are the same
as those under which private enemy property can be utilized or
destroyed, but in every case the neutral owner must be fully
indemnified."
During the'Franco-Prussian War the German military author-
ities had recourse to this right on several occasions. They took
possession of a large quantity of rolling stock belonging to the
Swiss and Austrian railroad systems, and used them for some
time for military purposes.16 A still more striking illustration is
to be found in the seizure and sinking of several British merchant
vessels in th Seine to prevent French gunboats from going up
the river and interfering with the means of German communica-
tion across the river. The English Government entered a strong
protest against the brutal manner in. which the sinking took place,
while the crew were still on board the vessels, but it did not
question the legality of the act of the German commander..7 At
the same time it put in a claim for full compensation for the
destruction of the ships. Bismarck defended the action of the
military authorities on strictly military grounds. "The measure
in question," he declared, "however exceptional in its nature did
not overstep the bounds of international warlike usage." There
was a pressing danger at hand "and every other means of meeting
it was wanting; the case was therefore one of necessity, which
even in time of peace may render the employment or destruction
of foreign property admissible under the reservation of inderhnifi-
cation." He was not willing to admit, however, that the'German
government was under any legal obligation in this instance to
indemnify the neutral owners of the vessels, but as an act of
comity he agreed that compensation should be paid.
A majority of the leading English and American jurists recog-
nize the legality of the modern right of angary, provided that
due indemnification is made for the use or destruction of the
25 2 Oppenheim, Ifiternational Law 395.
"' Ibid. p. 396.17 Stowell and Munro, International Cases, War and Neutrality,
p. 544.
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vessels. Two or three brief excerpts from representative writers
will suffice.
According to Sir Robert Phillimore 8 "such a usage is not
without the sanction of practice and usage and the approbation of
many good writers upon international law."
Halleck remarks' that "By 'virtue of this right neutral vessels
may be appropriated by a belligerent on payment of a reasonable
price for compensation."
Oppenheim comes to the same conclusion :20 "As a rule," he
lays down, "this law gives under certain circumstances and con-
ditions, the right to a belligerent to appropriate enemy property
only, but under other circumstances and conditions and exigencies,
it likewise gives a belligerent the right to appropriate and destroy
neutral property."
Calvo,21 the greatest of South American jurists, likewise de-
clares: "En cas de troubles civils ou de guerre exterieure l'interet
de se defense ou de sa surete peut mettre un Etat dans l'obligation
morale de porter momentan~ment atteinte a la liberte des trans-
actions commerciales, de paralyser les mouvements des navires
marchands, et meme de requerir ceux-ci pour les employer a des
transports de troupes et de munitions ou a d'autres operations
militaires. La raison d'Etat prime ici l'interet prive, national ou
etranger, et legitime l'emploi de ces moyens extremes designes sous
le nom d' arret de prince et d'angarie."
The same view is entertained by many continental writers.
22
Perels, who is perhaps the leading German authority on Seerecht
is apparently ready to admit the legality of the right of angary,
ever. in its older and more arbitrary form.23 "Das Kriegsrecht
erkennt nicht nur die Zuruckhaltung neutraler Handelsschiffe als
statthaft an, sondern auch die Befugnis der Kriegfuhrenden, sie
in ihren Hafen zu Transportdiensten ind ihre Besatzungen zu
Dienstleistungen hierbei heranzuziehen." -
The views of the continental writers on the legitimacy of
angary have been greatly influenced, as Professor Oppenheim
points out,24 by their attitude towards the doctrine of conditional
38 3 Phillimore, International Law 43.
19 1 Halleck, International Law 485.
20 2 Oppenheim, International Law 397.
213 Calvo, Droit International 138.
22 For example. Heffter, Bluntschli, Mass6, Hautefeuille, von Liszt,
Konig, and Kleen.
2 Perels, Das internationale offentliche Seerecht 221.
242 Oppenheim, International Law 444.
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contraband. Inasmuch as they deny the validity of the Anglo-
American doctrine of conditional contraband, they have been
forced to set up another principle in its place to justify the right
of the belligerent to pre-empt all goods which are bound fof a
hostile state. That principle they have found in the right of
angary.
These precedents and opinions find confirmation in the pro-
visions of the United States Naval code of 1900. Article 6 of that
code expressly stipulates:
"If military necessity should require it, neutral vessels found
within the limits of the belligerent authority may be seized and
destroyed, or otherwise utilized for military purposes, but in such
cases the owners of neutral vessels must be fully recompensed.
The amount of the indemnity should, if practicable, be agreed on
in advance with the owner or master of the vessel. Due regard
must be had to treaty stipulations upon these matters. ' 25
No provision of the Hague Convention deals directly with the
question of angary in relation to ships, but chapter 4, article 19
of the Fifth Convention, 1907, respecting the rights and duties of
neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, provides
that :26
"Railway material coming from the territory of neutral Pow-
ers, whether it be the property of the said Powers, or of com-
panies or private persons, and recognizable as such, shall not be
requisitioned or utilized by a belligerent except where and to the
extent that it is absolutely necessary. It shall be sent back as
soon as possible to the country of origin."
"A neutral power may likewise, in case of necessity, retain
and utilize to an equal extent material coming from the territory
of a belligerent Power."
"Compensation shall be paid by one party or the other in pro-
portion to the material used, and to the period of usage."
There is no material difference in principle, it is submitted,
between the rules which should govern the requisition of instru-
ments of commerce on land and in port. The two cases are clearly
analogous. The above convention is, by necessary implication,
equally adapted to transportation by sea. To lay down any other
rule would discriminate against sea powers. It would confer
upon a powerful inland state with excellent railroad connections
an effective control over neutral means of communication, while
25 Naval War College, International Discussions, 1903, p. 104.
262 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences 411.
420
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similar powers would be denied to its enemies who were forced
to rely upon naval forces and instrumentalities for purposes of
communication. It would be singular indeed if the right of angary
in respect to ships should be abrogated at the very moment when
the corresponding right of requisition of rolling stock on land was
receiving full recognition.
Notwithstanding these precedents, it must be admitted, there
are many jurists, including several English and American writers
of recent date, who either deny the legality of the right or, as is
usually the case, while admitting its validity, severely condemn
its exercise and demand its abolition. Dana acknowledges that
angary is recognized both by treaty and in practice but declares:
"It is not a right at all, but an act resorted to from necessity
for which an apology and compensation must be made at the peril
of war."27
DeBoeck pronounces2 it as "odieux et vexatoire." Lawrence
lays down2" that "nothing but long and uninterrupted usage can
justify a practice which runs counter to the rudimentary principle
that a belligerent must make war with his own resources." He
admits, however, that "unfortunately there can be no doubt that
the practice of states, even in modern times, has permitted such
seizures." The Institute of International Law has also pro-
nounced most strongly in favor of its abolition.30 Article 39 of
the "R~glement sur le regime legal des navires . . . dans les
ports etrangers" adopted by the Institute in 1898 provides: "Le
droit d'angarie est supprime soit en temps de paix soit en temps
de guerre quant aux navires neutres."
The British Regulations and Admiralty instructions furnish
perhaps the most striking argument in support of this view.
Article 446 reads:
"In the case of any British merchant ship, whose nationality
is unquestioned, being coerced into the conveyance of troops or
into taking part in other hostile acts, the senior naval officer
should there be no diplomatic or consular authority on the spot,
will remonstrate with the local authorities, and take such other
27 Wheaton, International Law, Dana Ed. note 152. He admits,
however, after a review of the treaties on the subject that "these
treaties certainly seem to recognize this angaria as a right, or at least
as a practice of nations, and only seek to regulate its exercise."
2 8 De Boeck, De la propri& privie ennemie sous pavillon ennemie
Sec. 737.
29 Lawrence. T. J., The Principles of International Law 516.
30 5 Revue Generale de Droit International Public, 1898, 858.
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steps to assure her release or exemption as the case may demand,
and may be in accordaince, with .the regulations."
,But this provision, it would seem, is directed primarily against
the older and now discredited form of angary, rather than against
the present mode of exercising the right. Moreover the regula-
tions do not venture to deny the legality of the practice. They
simply provide an effective means for securing the release of the
British vessel, which may have been requisitioned for naval pur-
poses without just cause.
But, notwithstanding the numerous protests against the right
of angary, it must be admitted, that the opponents of the legality
of the measure are in a minority. History and precedent are alike
against them. Some of these jurists, it is to be feared, have
allowed their righteous indignation at the frequent abuses of the,
right to bias their judgment as to its legality, and to lead them to
the conclusion that the right has disappeared or at any rate ought
to be abolished. "The wish has been father to the thought." But
it is "worse than idle" as Phillimore says :3
"To speak or write in a depreciatory tone. as some modern
writers do on the value and influence of usagein all international
affairs. Not only is. it a law to which both contending parties
may be held to have assented, but its notoriety acts as a notice
and warning" to foreigndr, 'that in certain contingencies certain
consequences will fall within a certain jurisdiction. It is optional
with them to place themselves or not within that jurisdiction; but
when the contingency, does arise and a consequence does follow
ignorantia frtris is morally and legally a bad plea."
The right of angary has indeed received either expressly or by
implication too frequent recognition, both in.treaties and practice,
even in modern times to be abrogated by the opinions of inter-
national publicists. Most of tlhese criticisms, more6ver, it will be
observed have been directed rather against the abuses than the
legality of the right. As is tob often -the ease in international
discussions, law, policy and expediency have become hopelessly
confused in the minds of the writers, and of the general public.
A number of international jurists, particularly those on the
continent, base the right of angary upon the doctrine of military
necessity.32 Von Liszt, for example, looks ,uponit as a form 'of
Kriegsraison.3 3 To him it is a rule of force rather than a prin-
ciple of law. But this conception savors altogether too much of
3" 3 Phillimore, International Law 42.
32For example, Dana, Rivier, and von Liszt.
s Von Liszt, Das V61kerrecht 197.
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Prussian militarism to commend it to the great majority of
students of international law. To this interpretation of the right
is doubtless due in part, much of the suspicion as to the legitimacy
of its exercise.
The true basis of the right, according to most Anglo-American
jurists, is to be found in the principle of territorial sovereignty. 4
The law of every state is supreme over both persons and property
within the local jurisdiction. In the case of the United- States v.
Diekelnman,35 the Supreme Court laid down emphatically that ships
which voluntarily enter a foreign port "thereby place themselves
under the laws of that port, whether in time of war, or of peace."
In other words, neutral vessels enter a belligerent port at their
own risk. They cannot claim the privileges of international com-
merce in time of war, without subjecting themselves to the legiti-
mate rights and operations of war. Neutral ships and neutral
property in belligerent territory enjoy the rights, and must share
the liabilities of the ships and property of citizens of the state,
save insofar as they are exempted by treaty or by the rules of
international law. The jurisdiction of the belligerent, it is true,
is seldom exercised over neutral goods which are only temporarily
within the country.30  But this limitation is essentially self-
imposed; it is a concession which i made to neutral interests on
the ground of public policy and convenience. It is a relaxation 0f
the rights of the belligerent state, rather than an acknowledgement
of the legal claims of the neutral.' In short, an ancient Roman
maxim, salus populi est suprema lex is operative in time of
national danger upon citizens and neutrals alike, within the local
jurisdiction.
But as this power is from its very nature a dangerous measure,
it should be exercised with the greatest caution, aid only under
the pressure of national emergency.37 This right most vitally
affects the political and commercial interests of neutrals. It ousts
the captain and crews from the vessel; it dispossesses the neutral
of his property; it interrupts the regular course of business; and
diverts the ordinary channels of commerce. And what is even
more serious, from a national standpoint, is the fact that it
3 4 Hall, International Law 743.
s5 (1875) 92 U. S. 520, 23 L. Ed. 742.3S*Hall, International Law 743."
37Phillimore says "it can only be excused and perhaps scarcely
then justified by that clear and. overwhelming necessity which would
compel an individual to seize his neighbor's horse or weapon to defend
his own life." 3 International Law 42.
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changes the, flag of the vessel, and forcibly withdraws it from the
protection and, control of its own government. To assert this
right is certainly a legitimate though extreme exercise of the war
power, but its enforcement is almost certain to occasion a feeling
of resentment and humiliation on.the part of the weaker nations.
There is all.the greater reason on this account that the right should
be exercised with all due consideration to the national pride and
financial'interests of, neutral states.
According to the older view, the belligerent was seemingly
under an obligation to compensate the neutral for loss, of freight
only.
"I1 serait juste aussi" says Mass6, 38 "de les indemniser en
outre des dommages qu'ils ont eu souffrir par suite de l'interrup-
tion de leur voyage ou de leurs expeditions; mais l'usage ne parait
pas aller jusque-la."
But it is safe to say that this restricted view of the liability of
the belligerent would not be entertained today., In all cases full.
compensation should be made, not only for the use of the vessel,
but also for the loss of profits and for the damage and destruction
of any,. of the ships during the voyage. 3  Whenever possible
an agreement for indemnity should.be arranged in advance., This
oblig4tion.is recognized not only in numerous treaties, but is con-
firmed in spirit, if not by the letter of the law, by article 53 of
the Hague Convention, providing for compensation for the use of
requisitioned means of communication in occupied territory.40
The action of. the United States government in this instance is
the more justifiable, because of the peculiar circumstances of the
case. The United States naval regulations, as we have seen,
distinctly recognized the legality of angary.41 : The Dutch vessels
accordingly entered the United States pprts at their own risk, and
they knew, or ought to have known, that they were subject to
requisition at -any time. -
In this case, moreover, the vessels were not simply birds of
passage temporarily within the jurisdiction. On the contrary,
the masters of the-vessels at the instance of the Dutch government
had. tied up the ships, and had permitted them to lie idle for
months in American ports, because they Were either unwilling or
afraid to put to sea. Meanwhile the United States government
38 3 Phillimore, International Law 42, note.
-P 3 Calvo, Drot International 139.4 0
,Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences.-
41 Ante p. 420.
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was negotiating with the Netherlands for the reciprocal exchange
bf Dutch shipping for American supplies. 42 But the efforts of
the government at Washington to effect an equitable arrangement
were defeated by German pressure at the Hague. During all this
time, the Dutch vessels were enjoying the protection of the
American government. It was evidently the intention that the
ships should remain in American ports indefinitely. For all
practical purposes; these vessels had acquired a new commercial
domicile; they had been transferred from Rotterdam to New
York. They were enjoying all the privileges of American ports,
and yet were refusing to make any return for the same.
At any time, as Secretary Lansing well says,43 "the United
States might have exercised its right to put these ships into a
service useful to it." Still it refrained from taking drastic action,
so long as there was any likelihood that the Dutch government
would agree to carry out the temporary arrangement44 which had
been entered into between the two countries early in the year for
such an exchange. The attitude of the Dutch government is the
more surprising in view of the fact that Norway has recognized
the justice of the American position and has agreed to place a
portion of its shipping at the disposal of the United States upon
most favorable terms.45 All that the United States has demanded
is that the Dutch shall put their vessels into active service again.
But the Dutch government has refused to make any concessions
or to meet the United States half way; it has continued to clamor
for food stuffs, but it has declined to charter its ships or restore
them to normal activity.4
Meanwhile, the railroads and canal boats of Holland have
been busily employed conveying goods to and from Germany and
the occupied districts of Belgium and France. And this com-
merce, it would seem, has not been confined solely and exclusively
to innocent goods.4 7 A different rule has apparently been applied
to the continental, than to the sea board traffic of the country.
Private and public organizations have been free to carry on trade
42 Memo. of Secretary of State Lansing. The Minneapolis Morning
Tribune, Apr. 13, 1918.
4 Ibid.
44Memo of President Wilson, New York Times, Mar. 21, 1918.
45 New York Times, Mar. 15, 1918.
46 Ibid.
47 Correspondence respecting the Transfer Traffic across Holland
of Materials susceptible of employmen-t or Military Supplies. Misc.
No. 17 (1917) Cd. 8693.
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through the regular instrumentalities with the Central Powers.
There has been no interdict on commerce with Germany, as in the
case of trade with England and the United States. There can be
little doubt in the present instance but that the action of the Dutch
ship owners has been governed by political considerations. They
have not been free-will agents. Almost from the outbreak of the
war, the commerce of the country has been placed under the direct
service' of the government or of semi-public organizations, such
as the Netherlands Over-Sea Trust, acting on its behalf.4 Rotter-
dam masters and merchants have had no occasion for discrim-
inating against the United States. The Allies have undoubtedly
exercised their belligerent rights upon the high-seas in a high-
handed manner at times to the great annoyance and disadvantage
of Dutch shipping, but they certainly have not been guilty of
flagrant illegality, or of the wholesale destruction of the lives and
property of Dutch citizens, by a systematic policy of piracy. There
was every reason to expect that the Dutch government would
meet the United States in a frank and conciliatory spirit. But the
German menace evidently got on the nerves of Dutch statesmen.49
They dared not enter into an advantageous shipping agreement
which might offend their powerful and threatening neighbor. The
spirit may have been willing, but the flesh was weak.
There is another factor which cannot be overlooked. The
rights and privileges of neutral nations must always be affected
somewhat adversely during a period of war. But it has been one
of the primary objects of international law to protect these rights
as far as possible. During the last fifty years more attention has
probably been paid to this phase of international law than to any
other. The extravagant claims of belligerent nations have been
gradually restricted in favor of neutral rights. But from the
very outbreak of the present war Germany has systematically
flouted these restrictions. She has cast the principles of inter-
national law to the winds. The rights of neutrals have been no
more respected than those of belligerents. By a policy of terror-
ism she has forced some of her neighbors to serve her own pur-
pose. In fact, if not in theory, the latter have been reduced to a
condition of physical subjection.
48 Measures Adopted to Intercept the Sea-borne Commerce of Ger-
many. Official Documents bearing uppn the European War, Series
12. International Conciliation, April, 1916, No. 101.
49The German government threatened to destroy all Dutch ves-
sels that engaged in the carriage of food supplies between America
and Europe.
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This was the practical problem that the United States and the
other Allies had to face. It was useless to protest to Germany
against these flagrant violations of international law. She heeded
them not. The Allies had already learned in the course of the
bitter struggle, that force could only be met by force. Slowly and
unwillingly they have been obliged to adopt retaliatory measures
of war, to meet gas attacks with counter attacks and Zeppelin
raids by bombing expeditions against German cities. To have
adopted any other policy would have placed a premium on illegal-
ity, and have imperilled the fighting efficiency of their own forces.
They would have fought the enemy with their own hands tied.
It was equally futile to appeal to neutral states to vindicate
their rights against Teutonic aggressions. They were powerless
to act. And in their helplessness they sacrificed not only their
own rights, but imperilled the rights of the Allies. When Holland,
under coercion, withdrew her ships from the high seas, she, wit-
tingly or unwittingly, played the German war game. The conduct
of the Dutch government was, even more effective than the
German submarine in driving commerce off the ocean. Here was
a new phase of the same problem. Neutrals as well as belligerents
were now involved. How was the illegal action of Germany in
respect to neutral commerce to be met by the Allied Powers? The
latter could not be indifferent to such a dangerous indirect attack
upon their most vital interests. The United States, as we have
seen, had no desire to resort to arbitrary measures. But it could
not permit Germany to carry out her submarine policy through
the medium of a neutral state. If Holland was unwilling or
unable to protect herself against Germany, she could not justly
complain if the United States should take such legal measures,
short of war, as might be necessary to defend this country against
her unneutral conduct. The requisition of the Dutch ships was
the American reply to the Dutch or more truly the German
embargo. In other words, it was a legitimate act of reprisal. But
the act, it should be remembered was a blow at Germany not at
Holland. The United States found it necessary to fight Germany
with the latter's own weapons and in this case the weapons
proved to be the ships of a neutral nation. There is however, a
fundamental difference in the mode in which the opposing bel-
ligerents have dealt with neutral shipping. It is the difference
between full compensation and "spurlos versenkt," between an
extreme but legitimate exercise of war power and ruthless murder
on the high seas.
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Throughout the negotiations, the United States has acted with
marked consideration. It not only postponed action until the last
possible moment, but also, on taking over the ships, offered the
most generous terms to the Dutch owners, for the use of them.5"
Only a relatively small proportion of Dutch shipping has been
requisitioned. The remaining tonnage is more than sufficient to
supply the domestic and colonial needs of the Netherlands. The
transaction is indeed a most profitable one for the Dutch ship
owners, since they receive the returns from the operation of the
ships, whereas the Allied governments assume all the risks. Not
only so, but the United States government has been more liberal
than the law demands.
"In order to insure to The Netherlands the future enjoyment
of her merchant marine intact, not only will ships be returned at
the termination of the existing war emergency, but the associated
governments have offered to replace in kind, rather than in money,
any vessels which may be lost whether by war or marine risk.
One hundred thousand tons of bread cereal which the German
government when appealed to refused to supply, have been offered
to The Netherlands by the associated governments out of their
own inadequate supplies, and arrangements are being perfected to
tender to The Netherlands government other commodities which
they desire to promote their national welfare and for which they
may freely send their ships."5' 1
In short, the United States government has sacrificed its own
belligerent rights and commercial interests to promote the national
well being and prosperity of a neutral nation.
In view of all these circumstances we may then conclude that
the action of the United States government is not only justifiable
in law and by precedent, but may ilso be defended on the grounds
of morality and fair dealing. On this issue the American govern-
ment need not fear an appeal to the judgment of history.
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